Washington’s decision to remove South Africa and Rwanda from preferential US trade access adds another layer of uncertainty for African exporters. For South Africa’s automotive industry, however, the damage began well before the latest announcement. A 25% tariff had already driven vehicle shipments to the American market down by more than 83%, forcing manufacturers and component suppliers to reconsider the economics of a relationship built over decades.
The announcement came with an uncomfortable sense of déjà vu for South Africa’s automotive industry. On November 2, 2026, the administration of President Donald Trump notified Congress and the governments of South Africa and Rwanda of its intention to terminate their eligibility for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), effective January 1, 2027. Washington cited what it described as barriers to American trade and investment, alongside concerns involving national security and foreign policy. Its assessment of South Africa also referred to corruption, while its concerns about Rwanda included human rights, political pluralism and the rule of law.
For Pretoria, the decision represents a further deterioration in a trade relationship that has become increasingly difficult to manage. For manufacturers exporting vehicles and components from South Africa, its immediate commercial consequences are more complicated. The 25% tariffs imposed by Washington under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 had already substantially weakened the value of AGOA preferences for the automotive sector. The new decision therefore arrives after a significant part of the original market advantage has been lost.
The distinction matters. AGOA provides eligible sub-Saharan African countries with preferential access to the US market, allowing qualifying products to enter without ordinary customs duties. Section 232 operates separately. The US administration imposed a 25% tariff on imported automobiles from April 3, 2025, and extended the measure to specified automotive parts from May 3. The tariffs applied irrespective of AGOA eligibility, substantially eroding the preference that South African manufacturers had relied on.
The result is visible in the export figures. South African vehicle shipments to the United States fell from 24,682 units in 2024 to 4,136 in 2025, a decline of 83.2%, according to the Automotive Business Council, naamsa. The association has argued that the proposed AGOA termination is unlikely to produce a comparable additional shock to vehicle volumes because the Section 232 measures have already changed the economics of supplying the American market.
The value figures tell a related but different story. NAACAM, the National Association of Automotive Component and Allied Manufacturers, reported that South Africa’s automotive exports to the US declined from R28.67 billion in 2024 to R20.43 billion in 2025. Direct component exports fell by 12.8% to R3.86 billion, while light vehicle exports declined by 31.7% to R16.57 billion. These value changes should not be confused with the 83.2% reduction in vehicle units: they cover different measures of trade and reflect different product mixes.
Renai Moothilal, chief executive of NAACAM, says the automotive industry had been one of AGOA’s largest users, but the preference had already been largely overridden by the Section 232 tariffs. His assessment is that the loss of AGOA adds cost to an industry that has absorbed a substantial shock. The direct cost of losing the preference may be modest relative to the existing tariff burden, he argues, but in a globally competitive industry every percentage point matters.
That final point is particularly important for component manufacturers. A vehicle assembled in South Africa is the visible end product of a much wider industrial network involving parts manufacturers, tooling companies, logistics providers, engineering services and specialist suppliers. When export volumes fall, the consequences travel backwards through the supply chain. Smaller component businesses are especially exposed because they often depend on production programmes and order volumes secured by a handful of vehicle manufacturers.
NAACAM has also pointed to pressure already accumulating within the supplier base. It has recorded 15 company closures and more than 7,500 gross job losses among component manufacturers over the preceding three years. The pressures include declining local content, production cuts by some vehicle manufacturers, weaker exports and rising operating costs. The American tariff dispute is therefore landing on an industry that was already confronting structural competitiveness challenges.
The exposure is not evenly distributed among manufacturers. Mercedes-Benz South Africa has been particularly exposed because locally manufactured C-Class models have been an important part of its exports to the United States. The East London production facility, now in KuGompo City, is closely linked to the company’s export strategy. BMW, which previously exported substantial volumes of X3 models from Rosslyn to the US, has shifted the destination of the newer generation of production towards other markets. Ford South Africa’s exports of Rangers to the US were comparatively small in 2025.
The industry’s concern extends beyond the immediate loss of orders. Automotive manufacturing depends on long production cycles, large capital commitments and predictable export destinations. Manufacturers invest in plants, supplier tooling, workforce skills and logistics infrastructure on the assumption that production volumes can be sustained over several years. A sudden change in market access can therefore affect investment decisions long after the original tariff has been imposed.
Shinny Gobiyeza, naamsa’s interim chief executive and chief operating officer, has argued that market access on paper must translate into commercially competitive access in practice. The association has called for a durable trade arrangement with the United States that protects production, investment and employment. It has also emphasized that the US remains an important trading partner and that preserving viable access serves the interests of both economies.
The broader industrial contribution explains why the dispute carries weight beyond the export statistics. South Africa’s automotive industry accounted for 23.8% of domestic manufacturing output in 2025, according to naamsa, and supports an extensive network of vehicle manufacturers, component suppliers and related businesses. Vehicle and component exports reached a record R291 billion that year. The sector’s importance lies not only in the value of vehicles shipped abroad, but also in the industrial capabilities, skilled employment and supplier relationships sustained by those exports.
There is, however, a distinction between the automotive industry’s exposure and South Africa’s overall dependence on AGOA. The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition said that approximately 89% of South African exports to the United States entered under ordinary World Trade Organization most-favoured-nation terms in 2025. Around 10% entered under AGOA, down from 28% in 2024. The value of South African exports under the programme fell from approximately US$4 billion in 2024 to US$1.7 billion in 2025. AGOA exports represented about 1% of South Africa’s total global exports.
Those figures help explain why the government has sought to distinguish the loss of preferential access from the broader bilateral relationship. Trade between South Africa and the United States reached US$28.8 billion in 2025, while more than 600 American companies operated in South Africa, supporting approximately 134,600 jobs. The two economies remain connected through investment, industrial inputs, minerals and services as well as finished goods.
Trade, Industry and Competition Minister Parks Tau said the decision did not define the entire relationship between the two countries. He maintained that a solution depended on both parties’ willingness to find common ground, while reaffirming the government’s intention to support affected sectors and protect South Africa’s national interests. Pretoria also said it had made additional concessions during negotiations that began in 2025, but that Washington had subsequently raised issues outside the original negotiating framework.
Washington’s position is different. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the administration’s annual eligibility review had found practices in both countries inconsistent with AGOA’s criteria. The US cited barriers to American trade and investment and concerns affecting national security and foreign policy. In Rwanda’s case, the administration also listed concerns involving political pluralism, workers’ rights and the rule of law. The announcement is therefore both a trade decision and an expression of wider diplomatic tensions.
Rwanda’s exposure is different from South Africa’s. Its direct automotive export relationship with the United States is far smaller, and its AGOA apparel benefits had already been suspended in 2018 after a dispute over restrictions on imports of second-hand clothing. The new decision nevertheless removes preferential access for other eligible exports, including agricultural products and minerals, and weakens the country’s position as a potential location for investors seeking duty-free access to the American market. The direct automotive impact is limited; the wider signal to investors is not.
For South Africa, the immediate task is to find commercially viable destinations for production that had been directed towards the United States. The European Union and United Kingdom remain established markets under existing trade arrangements, while the African Continental Free Trade Area offers a longer-term opportunity to deepen regional automotive value chains. Canada has also emerged as an alternative destination being explored by manufacturers. Yet market diversification is not a simple matter of redirecting shipments. Vehicle specifications, homologation requirements, distribution networks, shipping economics and local demand all influence whether another market can absorb production at scale.
The supplier base faces a harder adjustment. A large vehicle manufacturer may be able to reallocate production across international plants, but a component supplier whose equipment and workforce are configured for a particular model cannot necessarily replace lost orders quickly. The risk is that a reduction in export volumes could weaken local supplier capacity, reduce investment in tooling and technology, and make the domestic industry more dependent on imported components.
The next phase will be determined by three developments: whether diplomatic engagement can restore predictable access to the US market; whether manufacturers can redirect production without sacrificing scale; and whether South Africa can strengthen domestic demand and regional supply chains sufficiently to cushion external shocks.
AGOA’s withdrawal will not close the American market to South African vehicles or components. It will remove a preferential layer of access and expose qualifying products to the ordinary tariff treatment applicable outside the programme, alongside any other duties that remain in force. For passenger vehicles, the ordinary US tariff is typically 2.5%, although the applicable rate depends on the product’s tariff classification. The Section 232 tariff is a separate measure.
That distinction captures the larger problem confronting South Africa’s automotive industry. The country is still capable of manufacturing vehicles for global markets, but the cost of reaching those markets is increasingly shaped by political decisions beyond its control. The 83.2% fall in vehicle shipments to the United States was an early warning. The AGOA decision is another reminder that industrial competitiveness depends as much on the stability of trade relationships as it does on the quality, cost and productivity of the vehicles coming off the assembly line.

